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I. INTRODUCTION
As cellular' telephones have dramatically decreased in size, manufacturers
have continued to infuse more and more technology into these devices, some
of which are smaller than a deck of cards.' In addition to standard voice ser-
vices, offerings such as text and picture messaging, email, and Web access,
photo, and even video cameras are now commonplace.' Along with these func-
tions, approximately one hundred million mobile phones in the U.S. contain
Global Positioning System ("GPS") chips,4 and such phones will continue to
proliferate in the future.' Partially due to consumer demand for improved tech-
nology,6 and partly a response to a government mandate,7 this common ar-
rangement allows service providers to offer a host of new options and ser-
vices.' GPS technology, when installed on a cellular phone, allows precise
I J.D. Candidate, May 2008, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law.
The terms "cellular," "cell," "wireless," and "mobile" are used interchangeably in
discussing what the FCC terms "commercial mobile radio service ("CMRS")." 47 C.F.R. §
20.3 (2006).
2 Marguerite Reardon, 10 Things Your Phone Will Do in 10 Years, CNET NEWS, June
1, 2007, http://www.cnet.com/4520-13387_1-6737990-1 .html.
3 Id.
4 Melody Joy Kramer, Somebody's Watching You-and It's Your Cell Phone, NPR,
Sept. 18, 2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=6097216&sc=emaf.
5 Brad Smith, GPS: The Mobile Way, WIRELESS WEEK, Nov. 15, 2006,
http://www.wirelessweek.com/article.aspx?id=76952.
6 Id.
7 See 911 Service, 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2006); see also discussion infra Part IIl.B (dis-
cussing the Enhanced 911 System).
8 Smith, supra note 5.
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locating and tracking of anyone using such a GPS-enabled phone.9 Many cell
phone manufacturers install these chips regardless of whether the user or ser-
vice provider explicitly uses it, and many consumers are wholly unaware of the
potential, both good and bad, of this combined technology.
GPS technology simplifies tracking. Law enforcement officers need not at-
tach a tracking device to a suspect's car or plant one in his briefcase; they need
only know the number of the cell phone in his pocket. Yet as the ease and ac-
curacy of such tracking methods increases, so too does the need for privacy
protection. The judiciary and the legislature are at a crossroads. Law enforce-
ment agencies have asked cellular providers to supply cell site data,' and those
companies have often resisted. Both sides have turned to courts to settle the
cell site data dispute," but have yet to present arguments regarding the analo-
gous, more accurate GPS data. Bearing this analogy in mind, this Note will
examine court decisions on this issue, including the arguments for and against
granting government access to cell site data. In doing so, this Note will illus-
trate that courts face an equally difficult decision in choosing whether to grant
law enforcement access to more accurate GPS location data. This Note will
also elucidate flaws in the current statutory protections and argue that Congress
must address these flaws before court decisions become too disparate. The
promising benefits of GPS-enabled cell phones are as weighty as the potential
for its abuse; 2 the promise inherent in the combination of mobile phones and
GPS necessitates careful regulation and close scrutiny of government requests
for access to the information. '"
9 See CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING
§ 5:26, at 149 (2d ed. Supp. 2006) ("[C]ell phones provide a readily available tracking de-
vice that is carried around by a significant portion of the population.").
10 Cell site information identifies the physical location of a cellular subscriber by pro-
viding "information regarding the strength, angle, and timing of the caller's signal measured
at two or more cell sites" or towers. In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace De-
vice with Cell Site Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 748-49 (S.D. Tex. 2005) [here-
inafter Texas Pen/Trap Case]. It functions as the network-based analogue to handset-based
GPS tracking technology.
"t See discussion infra Part V.
12 In an interview on National Public Radio, Matt Richtel, technology correspondent for
The New York Times, stated that "courts are recognizing that Americans ... are carrying
devices that are at once wonderful communication devices, but also have the potential to let
people know where we are at all times, and the courts, just as we as consumers, must figure
out a balancing act between these two things." Talk of the Nation: Surveillance via Cell
Phone (NPR broadcast Dec. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5053410.
13 Clifford Fishman, Catholic University of America law professor and former New
York City Prosecutor, phrased the analysis as involving the "inevitable and invariable and
never-ending trade-off between improving police efficiency, which increases their ability to
protect us, at the cost of individual privacy and liberty, and here, as in throughout the entire
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Part II of this Note considers the regulatory schema limiting government ac-
cess to cell site data and the government's actions leading to the rise of GPS-
enabled cell phones. Part Ill examines the potential private and commercial
uses for applications of this technology focusing on beneficial applications.
Part IV considers the judicial uncertainty in applying relevant statutes to pro-
tect location data as private and evaluates the government arguments for access
to cell site data. 4 Part V analyzes the Fourth Amendment concerns in allowing
government access to such information. Finally, this Note concludes that con-
gressional clarification of the standard for government access to both cell site
data and GPS tracking information is necessary.
II. THE RISE AND POTENTIAL OF GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM-
ENABLED CELLULAR PHONES
A. The Global Positioning System
The Global Positioning System consists of twenty-four earth-orbiting satel-
lites, each broadcasting radio signals. 5 When a GPS receiver on Earth picks up
these signals, the receiver's location can be calculated based on its distance
from each satellite. 6 In a cellular phone, the receiver consists of a chip within
the phone.'7 Line-of-sight communication between the receiver and three satel-
lites allows calculation of the receiver's latitude and longitude; if a fourth sat-
ellite is available, the altitude of the receiver can also be determined. 8
Today's GPS technology began as a military initiative to standardize naviga-
tion systems and aid in precision weapons delivery. 9 In a coordinated effort
spectrum of surveillance, the question is where to draw the line and how to draw the line."
Id.
14 As will be further discussed, the use of "cell site data" or "network-based" location
techniques constitute one method of determining a cell phone's location; GPS technology or
"handset-based" location techniques compose the principal alternative. Readers should bear
this distinction in mind. See discussion infra Part IlI.B.
'5 The Global Positioning System, http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/index.html (last
visited Nov. 7, 2007).
16 Id.
17 James E. Holloway et al., Regulation and Public Policy in the Full Deployment of the
Enhanced Emergency Call System (E-911) and Their Influence on Wireless Cellular and
Other Technologies, 12 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 93, 103 (2006).
I8 SCOTT PACE ET AL., THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM 237-38 app. B (1995), avail-
able at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographreports/MR614/MR614.appb.pdf.
19 Id. at 238.
Beginning in the early 1960s, the U.S. Department of Defense began pursuing the idea
of developing a global, all-weather, continuously available, highly accurate positioning
and navigation system that could address the needs of a broad spectrum of users and at
2007]
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among the Army, Air Force, and Navy, the first GPS satellites were launched
in 1978.20 That year, GPS receivers were employed on military craft in the air,
sea, and on land, but individual, personal GPS receivers consisted of a twenty-
five pound backpack." The system came of age in the early 1990s during the
Persian Gulf War. A shortage of military receivers compelled the Armed
Forces to order more than ten thousand receivers from commercial producers.22
The successful demonstration of GPS technology in the Gulf War was a major
boon not only to the military, but to the fledgling commercial GPS market as
well.23
Around that time, GPS also began to appear in commercial vehicles.24 As
GPS and other technologies have developed in the years since, the uses of GPS
have multiplied and varied. The advent of high-resolution color displays and
browser-enabled cell phones with high-speed wireless capabilities has led to
the successful and prolific coupling of cell phones with GPS technology.25
Indeed, cellular GPS units have certain advantages over their in-car brethren.
In addition to providing driving directions, GPS-enabled phones can provide
more useful walking directions.26 Additionally, whereas the maps for in-car
systems are often out-of-date by the time the car is sold and can cost hundreds
of dollars to update, cellular GPS units rely on Internet servers and are thus
constantly updated.27
Whether cellular or otherwise, GPS systems do have limitations. Due to
their reliance on satellites, GPS receivers are prone to losing reception indoors
and in dense cities. 21 In an effort to combat this problem, some cellular manu-
facturers have begun installing "assisted GPS" systems.29 Assisted GPS com-
the same time save the [Department of Defense] money by limiting the proliferation of
specialized equipment that supported only particular mission requirements.
Id.
20 Id. at 240-41.
21 Id at 242.
22 Id at 245.
23 Id. at 250.
24 Smith, supra note 5.
25 Kate Norton, Europe Takes to Location-Based Cell Service, Bus. WK., Oct. 13, 2006,
available at
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/oct2006/tc2OO61013 164404.htm.
26 Michael Kanellos, Lost? Try Asking Your Cell Phone, CNET NEWS, Oct. 31, 2006,
http://news.com.com/2100-1039_3-6131236.html.
27 Smith, supra note 5. Despite these advantages, fewer than three percent of cell phone
users routinely consult maps or navigation on their cell phones. Parents Want Child Track-
ing, Youths Want Social Networking, GPS WORLD, Aug. 6, 2007, available at
http://lbs.gpsworld.com/gpslbs/article/articleDetail.jspid=447414.
28 Dan Charles, GPS is Smartening Up Your Cell Phone, NPR, Sept. 25, 2006,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storylD=6097216&sc=emaf.
29 Elena Malykhina, Nokia Wants Your Cell Phone to Tell You Where You Are, INFO.
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bines cell tower triangulation techniques with location information from satel-
lites.3" Whether standard or assisted, GPS provides location information more
accurately than traditional cell site triangulation methods.3
The commercialization of GPS has led to a plethora of not only goods,
namely a wide variety of GPS receivers, but also services allowing navigation,
location, and tracking.32 Similarly, the internationalization of the system has
allowed foreign companies to create devices and services designed to meet the
demands of an array of distinct societies.33 The inclusion of GPS technology in
cell phones has allowed, and in fact driven, industry to find new ways to use
this technology. This technology comes in forms including so-called location-
based services ("LBS"), and services allowing the tracking of employees and
children.34
B. Location-Based Services
LBS operate on the principle that a person's exact position "at a fine level of
granularity (much finer than zip code), via global positioning systems [sic]
(GPS), will be a datum that can be known automatically . . .and constantly
utilized."35 Using such location data, LBS allow cellular subscribers to receive
information about the people and places around them. LBS have already
gained a substantial following in Japan and South Korea.36
WK., Oct. 9, 2006, available at
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD= 193105219.
30 Smith, supra note 5.
31 See discussion infra Part III.B.
32 The U.S. first offered GPS for civilian use in 1983. Even before the system was fully
operational, it gained significant popularity among surveyors. Indeed, "[s]atellite surveying
also helped sustain the commercial market for GPS equipment after the Challenger disaster
shut down operations and delayed satellite launches for several years." PACE ET AL., supra
note 18, at 247-49.
33 International use of the U.S.-created system was granted by President Reagan in the
same announcement that opened GPS up for commercial use. PACE ET AL., supra note 18, at
247-48. As will be discussed later, internationalizing GPS has also led to a diversity of
regulatory schema protecting to various degrees the rights and privacy of a society's citi-
zens-and furnishing a comparison and model for U.S. regulations. See infra notes 99-104
and accompanying text.
34 Parents Want Child Tracking, Youths Want Social Networking, supra note 27.
35 Jerry Kang & Dana Cuff, Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Public Sphere, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 93, 103-04 (2005).
36 Hiawatha Bray, Cellphone GPS Services Find Their Way Into Market, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 19, 2006, available at
http://www.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2006/04/19/cellphonegpsservices findth
eir way intomarket; see also Press Release, Frost & Sullivan, Value-Added Offerings to
Spur Growth of Location-Based Services (July 3, 2007) available at
http://www.frost.com/prod/servlet/press-en-press.pag (search "spur growth"; then follow
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One such location-based application is the so-called friend-finder service,
which alerts cellular subscribers when contacts are nearby. 7 As one commen-
tator predicted, "GPS intelligence that we carry on our person will notify con-
tacts in our vicinity of our precise location. This could lead to spontaneous
gatherings, as people quickly find one another in real time and real places."38
In some places, such prophecies have come to fruition. In South Korea, for
instance, friend-finder services already comprised more than four million
members in 2005, with subscriptions growing at seventy-four percent per
year. 9 One South Korean LBS sends text messages to friends who are within a
block of one another.40 Another similar service periodically texts a subscriber's
location to specified people while that subscriber is traveling.4
While social LBS took off quickly in South Korea and Japan, in America
they remained in their infancy and have only recently begun to gain momen-
tum and a strong following.42 Even as MySpace43 and Facebook" become
commonplace online social networking sites, only twenty-six percent of
American cell phone owners between ages eighteen and twenty-four want the
mobile equivalent.45 For those who do, however, the options for mobile social
networking LBS grow daily. For instance, Boost Mobile, a subsidiary of Sprint
hyperlink to article). ("Japan and South Korea are by far the most developed LBS markets
accounting for nearly 92 percent of the total revenues in Asia-Pacific.").
37 Timothy Zick, Clouds, Cameras, and Computers: The First Amendment and Net-
worked Public Places, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1, 19 (2007); see also Kang & Cuff, supra note 35,
at 104 ("[W]hen you enter the shopping mall, all friends in your social network who are
nearby can be buzzed.").
38 Zick, supra note 37, at 19-20.
39 Id. South Korea makes for an interesting comparison to the United States in terms of
the way its people and its government have handled the wealth of information provided by
GPS. As will be seen, South Koreans have embraced this tracking technology while Ameri-
cans remain generally apprehensive. See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text. On the
other hand, the South Korean government has regulated the use of tracking technologies in
ways some American scholars advocate the U.S. government should. Jill Yung, Big Brother
is Watching: How Employee Monitoring in 2004 Brought Orwell's 1984 to Life and What
the Law Should Do About It, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 163, 212-18 (2005). Interestingly,
President Reagan's decision to allow international civil use of the Global Positioning Sys-
tem came on the heels of the downing of Korean Airlines Flight 007 over the Soviet Union.
PACE ET AL., supra note 18, at 247-48.
40 Moon Ihlwan & Andy Reinhardt, "Working Late" Won 't Work Anymore, Bus. WK.,
Oct. 31, 2005, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_44/b3957069.htm.
41 Id.
42 Press Release, ABIresearch, GPS-Enabled Location-Based Services (LBS) Subscrib-
ers Will Total 315 Million in Five Years (Sept. 27, 2006), available at
http://www.abiresearch.com/abiprdisplay.jsp?pressid=73 1.
43 MySpace, http://www.myspace.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
44 Facebook, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
45 Parents Want Child Tracking, Youths Want Social Networking, supra note 27.
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Nextel Corporation,46 offers the "loopt service," with over one hundred thou-
sand customers subscribing to the service.47 Loopt relies on a GPS-enabled
wireless network to notify users when their friends are nearby. The service
costs subscribers about three dollars per month and allows users to turn it off
when they do not wish to be found by friends.4" However, Boost promotes the
loopt service as a useful social networking tool: "[m]any times a day, your
friends are nearby and free to hangout without you knowing it. Boost loopt
makes sure you never miss that opportunity for a spontaneous meet up."49
While loopt is currently available only on the Boost and Sprint mobile net-
works, the service aims to become available on other cell service carriers as
well.5" Loopt is just one of many social LBS fighting to gain a foothold in the
market. Loopt's co-founder, Sam Altman, tallies seventy-eight competitors to
the loopt service in the United States alone, including Google's Dodgeball
service, which also allows users to locate one another.
Not all LBS are social in nature. In fact, at least one company has introduced
LBS specifically for those interested in individualistic endeavors. Trimble, one
of the largest producers of GPS chips and components, offers several packages
combining GPS-enabled cell phones and proprietary LBS software through its
Trimble Outdoors subsidiary. 2 The company claims that, by combining their
functions, Trimble Outdoors devices will remedy the common situation of
outdoor enthusiasts carrying three devices: a GPS receiver for navigation, a
cell phone for communication, and a camera for photography. 3 The Trimble
Outdoors line allows users to track their off-road movements on their cell
phones, as well as display their speed, direction, altitude, and coordinate loca-
tion.54 While that line is aimed at campers, hikers, and other outdoor enthusi-
46 Boost Company History,
http://www.boostmobile.com/about/boost-background/company history.html (last visited
Nov. 7, 2007).
47 Aaron Ricadela, Building a Super Cell Phone, Bus. WK., Mar. 26, 2007, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/mar2007/tc20070326 934874.htm.
Loopt is an add-on service, and the loopt company is not a part of either Boost Mobile or
Sprint Nextel Corporation. Id.
48 Boost Mobile FAQ, http://support.boostmobile.com/payasyougo (last visited Nov 7,
2007).
49 Id.
50 Loopt, https://loopt.com/loopt/sess/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
51 Ricadela, supra note 47.
52 Trimble Outdoors, About Us, http://www.trimbleoutdoors.com/aboutus.aspx (last
visited Nov. 7, 2007).
53 Press Release, Trimble, Nextel and Trimble Join Forces to Offer the Only Outdoor
Recreation Product the Uses Mobile Phones for Navigation and Trip Planning (Oct. 25,
2004), available at http://investor.trimble.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD= 191154.
54 Trimble Outdoors Silver, http://www.trimbleoutdoors.com/aboutsilver.aspx (last
visited Nov. 7, 2007).
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asts, the company's AllSportGPS line serves a different function: it provides
users with workout data and is geared toward runners and cyclists.55 AIliS-
portGPS uses GPS networks to measure distance and speed, and to record us-
ers' routes and elevations. 6 Both services are compatible with a number of
GPS-enabled phone models from a variety of service providers.57
More importantly to businesses, GPS-enabled cell phones allow for targeted
advertising. In Japan, for example, cell users can choose to receive text mes-
sages advertising sales at nearby stores.58 In another variation, a subscriber's
location and direction would determine the "points of interest," such as stores
and restaurants on the route, displayed by the GPS unit.59 MINI USA recently
announced a program where drivers with a radio frequency identification
("RFID") chip on their keychain will have billboards display messages person-
alized for each driver.6" One could easily imagine the same being done by us-
ing GPS-enabled cell phones rather than RFID chips.
The trend for such personalized advertising services is unclear.61 At least
one scholar believes its impact on consumers will be minor, arguing that "new
forms of targeted advertising or spamming that rely upon the GPS features in
personal devices will bombard an already advertising-saturated public."62 On
the other hand, several studies indicate that the use and popularity of such ser-
vices is on the rise. Early estimates predicted that South Korean consumer
spending on such services would triple to $1.54 billion in 2007.63 In thirteen
55 Press Release, Trimble, Trimble Launches AllSport GPS for its Trimble Outdoors
Product Line (Aug. 28, 2006), available at
http://investor.trimble.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=209076.
56 Id.
57 See Phones Supported by Trimble Outdoors,
http://www.trimbleoutdoors.com/SupportedPhones.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2007); see also
AllSportGPS Supported Devices, http://www.allsportgps.com/phones/howtobuy.aspx (click
on carriers to see phones offered) (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
58 Ihlwan & Reinhardt, supra note 40.
59 Kang & Cuff, supra note 35, at 104.
60 Press Release, MiniUSA, First-Ever "Talking" Billboards Revealed to Mini Motor-
ists; Smiles Expected as Drivers "Motorby" (Jan. 31, 2007), available at
http://www.miniusa.com/#/learn/awards-news-events/news (follow "Talking Billboards
Revealed" hyperlink).
61 Social and commercial location-based services are only the beginning of the LBS that
are offered or that may be imagined. Weather and yellow page services, which are specific
to a user's location, are at the simpler end of the spectrum; at the other end, services such as
Smarter Agent provide information to realtors about recent transactions and average prop-
erty values near the user's location. Charles, supra note 28. Indeed, Nextel has allowed
access to geographic coordinates calculated by the chips in its phones. This has allowed
private programmers to develop software that utilizes this information. Some of these pro-
grams are downloadable via the internet. Id.
62 Zick, supra note 37, at 26.
63 Ihlwan & Reinhardt, supra, note 40. Such growth would mark a threefold increase
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other major Asian markets, spending is projected to rise at about fifteen per-
cent per year, to a total of $447 million by the end of 2009.64 European LBS
are projected to climb from just over $180 million in 2005 to $780 million by
2010.65 Worldwide, only about 12 million cellular customers pay for LBS, but
that number could increase to 315 million in five years, by one estimate.66 An-
other report expects LBS to become an $8.5 billion business by 2010.67 In the
U.S., LBS represent a $750 million market, which is expected to double in the
next two years.6 8 Likewise, location-based functions top the list of features
consumers want in their phones.69 One market survey showed that, aside from
talking, U.S. consumers' top three desired uses for their cell phones were "call-
ing up maps and directions, finding friends and family members, and avoiding
traffic jams."7
C. Cellular Tracking Services
While forecasters are optimistic about the growth of LBS, the outlook is less
optimistic for GPS tracking services, a second major innovation created by
incorporating GPS technology into cell phones. American consumers have thus
far been wary of anyone tracking their movements, at least in part due to pri-
vacy concerns. Still, forty-two percent of parents with children under thirteen
report that they are willing to pay for LBS that will track their children's cell
phones;7' and this figure does not take into account the rising number of busi-
nesses using GPS-based tracking services to keep an electronic eye on their
employees.72
over revenues of $500 million in 2004. Id.
64 Press Release, Frost & Sullivan, supra note 36.
65 Norton, supra note 25. These figures include only revenues received by the cellular
service providers, not those received by the stores, companies, and services offered to con-
sumers via LBS advertising. Id
66 Smith, supra, note 5; see also Press Release, ABIresearch, supra note 42. In 2006,
less than half a percent of wireless users subscribed to LBS; the projection of 315 million
subscribers would represent a nine percent market presence. Id.
67 Malykhina, supra note 29.
68 Dan Costa, Yes, I Spy on My Kid, PC MAGAZtNE, July 17, 2007, available at
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0, 1895,2145504,00.asp.
69 Ricadela, supra note 47.
70 Id. (citing a study conducted in April 2006 by market research firm In-Stat, polling
1,363 "tech-savvy consumers."). One might question whether a similar study polling aver-
age cell phone users would reveal the same results, especially when many cell phone users
are blissfully unaware that their cell phone contains a GPS chip.
71 Parents Want Child Tracking, Youths Want Social Networking, supra note 27.
72 Diane Cadrain, GPS On Rise: Workers' Complaints May Follow, HR MAG., Apr.
2005, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m3495/is_4 50/ai-n13629523.
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1. The Maternal Eye: Monitoring Children via Global Positioning System-
Enabled Cell Phones
Several companies offer services allowing parents to track their children's
GPS-enabled cell phones. The uLocate service, launched in 2003, allows par-
ents to obtain a child's last known location, as well as the direction and speed
at which the child is traveling, and download the information either on their
own compatible phone or via an Internet connection.73 Additionally, parents
can program the system to alert them when a child reaches a preset location or
travels outside of a pre-defined area.74
In June 2006, the Walt Disney Company launched Disney Mobile, promot-
ing the system as "the first national wireless phone service specifically de-
signed for families."75 The system combined voice and text services with the
entertainment content one might expect from Disney, while allowing parents to
closely monitor children's cell phone usage and restrict when and with whom
children may use the phones.76 Additionally, Disney Mobile provided a Family
Locator function similar to the uLocate system. Using either their own Disney
Mobile cell phone or an Internet connection, parents could locate their chil-
dren's GPS-enabled Disney Mobile cell phone.77 Parents could then view both
a map and accuracy indicator, appearing as a red circle on the map covering
the accuracy range of the phone's GPS chip.78 Accessing the Family Locator
function required a personal identification number set by parents.79 Priced
comparably to similar GPS locator services, the Disney Mobile service plan
included five locates per month, with each additional locate costing forty-nine
cents; or users could opt for Family Locator Unlimited, which cost about thir-
teen dollars per month.8
73 Press Release, uLocate Commc'ns, Inc., New Service Enables Parents to Pinpoint
Kids' Whereabouts Using Cell Phones (Oct. 6,2003), http://www.ulocate.com/10-6-03.php.
74 Id




77 See Disney Mobile, http://disneymobile.go.com (follow "family locator" hyperlink)
(last visited Aug. 7, 2007).
78 See id (demonstrating the Disney Mobile Family Locator service).
79 Disney Mobile, http://www.disneymobile.go.com/disneymobile/home (click on
"Family locator"; then "View Demo"; then "Start Demo") (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
80 Disney Mobile,
http://disneymobile.go.com/disneymobile/inctudedServicesandFeatures.do?method=viewinc
ludedservicesfeatures (last visited Sept. 21, 2007); Disney Mobile Optional Services &
Features,
http://disneymobile.go.com/disneymobile/browseShop.do?method=viewServicesFeatures
(last visited Sept. 22, 2007).
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Perhaps responding to reservations American consumers have expressed
about other such plans, Disney attempted to market the service without impli-
cating privacy considerations. For instance, one television commercial for Dis-
ney Mobile depicted a child bragging about how "cool" his mom is for letting
him have a cell phone with voice, text and Disney entertainment functions; the
next scene showed his mother demonstrating functions including the Family
Locator service for her adult friends, who also rave that she must be "the cool-
est mom ever." Additionally, Disney promoted the GPS service as a "family
locator," when in fact adult phones on the plan could not be used to locate
other adults' phones, nor could children's phones locate those of adults.8'
The Disney Company never owned its own cell towers or equipment; rather,
Disney Mobile acted as a mobile virtual network operator ("MVNO"),82 having
joined with Sprint, to offer cellular service using that provider's equipment.83
Shortly after launching Disney Mobile MVNO in the United States, Disney
scrapped plans to offer the service in the United Kingdom, 4 possibly due to
the disappointing performances of its two MVNOs offered in the United
States. 5 Indeed, Disney Mobile's domestic sales were so disappointing that in
September, 2007, the company announced that it would cease operation at the
81 Disney Mobile FAQs, http://disneymobile.go.com/disneymobile/faq.do (last visited
Sept. 21, 2007) (Under Family Locator section see questions: "Will anyone be able to locate
adult phones on my plan with Family Locator?" and "Will my child be able to locate other
family members' phones with Family Locator?").
82 A MVNO is defined as "an organization that buys minutes and services wholesale
from an existing cell phone carrier (or carriers) and resells them under its own brand .... A
MVNO is basically a reseller. It does not have radio frequency (spectrum)." NEWTON'S
TELECOM DICTIONARY 624 (23 ed. 2007).
83 Press Release, Disney Corp., Disney Teams with Sprint to Offer National Wireless
Service for Families (July 6, 2005), available at
http://corporate.disney.go.com/news/corporate/2005/2005-0706-disneyteamsprint.html.
84 Jo Best, Disney Cancels U.K. Mobile Kid-Tracking, CNET NEWS, Aug. 14, 2006,
http://news.com.com/Disney+cancels+U.K.+mobile+kid-tracking/2100-1039_3-
6105149.html; see also Bill Ray, Disney Scraps UK Mobile Plan, THE REGISTER, Aug. 16,
2006, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/08/16/disneymvno-pulled.
85 See Roger Cheng, Mobile ESPN's Struggle Illustrates Hardships Serving Niche Mar-
kets, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2006, at A12A (stating that the Walt Disney Company, which
owned both Mobile ESPN and the Disney Mobile MVNOs, decided to end the Mobile
ESPN service in September 2006 because of disappointing numbers, but kept Disney Mo-
bile despite the possibility that it "could run into the same problem."); see also Gene J.
Koprowski, Promising MVNO Market Fails to Meet Expectations, E-COMMERCE TIMES,
Aug. 15, 2006, http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/52396.html (stating both Disney
Mobile and Mobile ESPN were not competitive in market share); cf Andrew Wallenstein,
ESPN Back in Mobile Game After Costly Flop, REUTERS, Feb. 9, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/televisionNews/idUSN0920849920070212?pageNumber= 1
(announcing agreement between ESPN and both Verizon Wireless and MediaFlo USA to
offer Mobile ESPN as content over carriers' networks).
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end of that year, after just 15 months of operation.8 6 At least one factor in Dis-
ney Mobile's shutdown was intense competition among MVNOs and tradi-
tional cellular service providers.87 For instance, Verizon Wireless offers the
Chaperone Service, with features strikingly similar to those formerly offered
by Disney Mobile.88 Despite American reservations regarding cellular track-
ing--even of family members-companies seem likely to continue offering
such services for the foreseeable future.
2. Paternalism in Business.: Using Cellular GPS to Track Employees
Parents are not the only users of GPS cell phone tracking technology. An in-
creasing number of employers are utilizing this technology to keep a paternal-
istic eye on their employees in the field. 9 In some cases, employers may have
legitimate purposes in monitoring employee actions while on the job.9" For
example, several companies offer so-called "fleet management" systems.9'
These systems track the location of a GPS unit, and many "tout their ability to
prevent theft of company assets, verify employee productivity, and reduce
insurance premiums by providing carriers with evidence that drivers comply
with traffic laws."9 Services such as Cingular's Work Order Manager provide
dispatchers with exact locations of technicians, so the one closest to the job site
can be sent.93 In South Korea, at least one company uses a similar service to
86 Press Release, Disney Corporate, Disney to End U.S.-Based MVNO Operations;
Explore New Business Model for Popular Family Centric Suite of Services and Content for
Mobile (Sept. 27, 2007), available at
http://corporate.disney.go.com/news/corporate/2007/2007 0927_mobile.html; see also
Signal Fades for Disney Mobile, THESTREET, Sept. 27, 2007,
http://www.thestreet.com/newsanalysis/techtelecom/10381822.html.
87 Press Release, Disney Corporate, Disney to End U.S.-Based MVNO Operations;
Explore New Business Model for Popular Family Centric Suite of Services and Content for
Mobile (Sept. 27, 2007), available at
http://corporate.disney.go.com/news/corporate/2007/2007 0927_mobile.html.
88 http://www.verizonwireless.comb2c/splash/chaperone/index.jsp.
89 Cadrain, supra note 72 ("[E]mployer use of global positioning system (GPS)-based
employee monitoring is a wave that hasn't even begun to crest."). Employer use of GPS
technology to monitor employees provides an interesting comparison for government use of
the same technology to monitor its citizens, and is discussed here for that purpose. For an in-
depth analysis of the problems created by employer use of GPS tracking, and at least one
proposed solution, see Yung, supra note 39.
90 Yung, supra note 39, at 176-77. GPS tracking allows employers to observe any em-
ployees that are breaking the law. It may also help an employer to obtain lower insurance
rates, recover lost or stolen property, and increase efficiency. Id.
91 See, e.g., GPS Fleet Solutions, http://www.gpsfleetsolutions.com (last visited Nov. 7,
2007).
92 Yung, supra note 39, at 172.
93 Smith, supra note 5.
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locate and dispatch the cab closest to a customer.94 However, in the U.S., such
systems have met with limited success as taxi cab drivers in New York City95
and Philadelphia96 have vocally opposed their installation. Trucker unions have
been equally critical of such tracking measures, which they consider invasive.97
One cause of criticism is that, when employed on GPS-enabled cell phones,
such systems enable employers to monitor much more than their equipment; it
also allows monitoring of the location and activities of employees, in some
cases both on the job and in their own time."
Nonetheless, in South Korea, sales of business-related tracking services con-
tinue to flourish.99 This may be due in part to the South Korean government's
willingness to regulate employer tracking. In late 2004, the National Assembly
passed a law requiring a government license to gather location information on
employees.' 0 Under the law, only designated people can view the tracking
information, and the tracked individual can inspect records of tracking re-
quests.'' In the United States, on the other hand, the Fourth Amendment does
not apply to the private sector."2 In fact, in most cases, companies providing
cell phones to employees do not need to disclose that those phones can be
tracked by the employer using GPS.0 3 Only Connecticut mandates disclosure
of such information."° If parents can so easily track their children using GPS-
enabled cellular technology, and companies can so paternalistically monitor
the actions of their employees, it bears asking whether anything stops the gov-
ernment from surveilling the average citizen using the same methods.
D. Turning it Off
Of course, one method of avoiding parental, employer, or governmental
tracking via a GPS-enabled cell phone would be to simply turn off the phone's
94 lhlwan & Reinhardt, supra note 40.
95 K.C. Jones, Cabbies Say 'No' to GPS, INFO. WK., Oct. 3, 2005,
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD= 171202670.
96 Steve Inskeep, Taxi Drivers Wary of GPS Tracking Plan, NPR, Aug. 17, 2006,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5662500.
97 Rachel King, Tracking Trucks the Telematics Way, Bus. WK., Oct. 9, 2006, available
at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/oct2006/tc20061009_055494.htm.
98 See Yung, supra note 39, at 172-75.
99 Ihlwan & Reinhardt, supra note 40.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (noting that the Court has "con-
sistently construed [Fourth Amendment] protection as proscribing only governmental ac-
tion").
103 Kramer, supra note 4.
104 Cadrain, supra note 72.
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internal GPS receiver. 5 Some phones equipped with GPS enable the user to
partially disable the GPS by opting for a 911-only setting.1 6 Not all phones,
however, give the user such an option, and because of the E-911 mandate, con-
sumers cannot entirely disable the GPS chip.0 7 Cellular service providers and
third parties offering LBS via cellular GPS argue that, except for E-91 1, all
other location-based services require the user to sign up; thus cellular subscrib-
ers will receive only the services they want and affirmatively request.0 8 Still,
just because a cell phone user does not opt for a family tracking plan or a
friend-finder service does not make his phone immune to GPS tracking.
Whether through GPS or tower triangulation, an active phone can be tracked.'09
Employees wary of having their work phones tracked while off the clock
have found some inventive ways to allegedly thwart the GPS signals. Because
GPS relies on a line-of-sight connection with satellites, placing a GPS-enabled
cell phone under a vehicle seat or in a glove box, or taking it inside a building
may cause the signal to be lost."' More creatively, some Web sites suggest
wrapping the phone in tin foil to disrupt the signal."' However, many of these
techniques would also cut off the network signal, rendering the phone essen-
tially useless.
Another method of thwarting GPS tracking, which is perhaps more practical,
is to simply turn the phone off. However, this too is an uncertain solution.
Even when the user presses the power button, some cell phones "can't be fully
powered down without removing the battery."" 2 Additionally, there is some
105 The simplest solution, of course, would be to carry no cell phone at all. However, the
ubiquity of the cell phone and the important (or vital) role it has come to play in society
almost makes this not an option. Likewise, using a cell phone that is not GPS-enabled is
becoming increasingly a non-option, and even those can be tracked, albeit with less accu-
racy, via cell tower triangulation. See infra Part III.B.
106 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Fact Sheet 2(b): Cell Phone Technology (Oct. 2006),
http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs2b-cellprivacy.htm.
107 See id.
108 Jay Wrolstad, Sprint Claims First with E911-Capable Phone, NEWSFACTOR
NETWORK, Oct. 4, 2001, http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/story/13952.html.
109 See Talk of the Nation: Surveillance via Cell Phone, supra note 12 (interview of Matt
Richtel, technology correspondent for The New York Times). "[A]ny time you're hooked
into the network, by definition, your carrier knows where you are. Think of it this way. They
need to know if you're roaming in order to bill you extra." Id.
110 The GPS Primer, GPS Pitfalls, http://gpsprimer.net/gpspitfalls.html (last visited
Nov. 7, 2007). Taking a phone into a building to impede GPS tracking still allows anyone
collecting the data to determine at least roughly which building the phone is in, and the
signal will return when the phone is brought back outside.
"I Global Tracking Communications Inc., GPS Tracking FAQ,
http://www.gpstrackit.com/faq.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).




evidence indicating that at least certain parts of a cell phone, including the
microphone, can be remotely activated even when the user has turned the
phone off."3 If a cell phone's microphone can be remotely activated, it is en-
tirely possible that its GPS chip, or the entire phone, could likewise be re-
motely activated. Even if this is not the case, powering down one's cell phone
and removing the battery to avoid the possibility of GPS tracking renders the
device useless. In short, there is no certain way to prevent GPS tracking of an
enabled cell phone. Thus, the judiciary and the legislature must determine who
may access GPS tracking data from cell phones and under what circum-
stances.'"
Ill. LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF CELLULAR TRACKING
INFORMATION
The integration of GPS into cell phones adds a new wrinkle to an area of
law constantly besieged by technological advances. Although the combination
of GPS and cellular technology is relatively new, scholars already have ex-
pressed concern about the Fourth Amendment issues it implicates." 5 Such
apprehension will only increase as the technology becomes more prevalent and
both private and governmental parties introduce new applications for its use." 6
Courts have evinced similar concerns," 7 but absent any precedent or legislative
directive, they have been unsure how to balance privacy concerns against a
legitimate need for cellular location information derived from either network-
based or handset-based GPS technologies." 8 The state of the law is in flux," 9
http://news.com.com/FBI+taps+cell+phone+mic+as+eavesdropping+tool/2100-1029_3-
6140191.html.
113 See United States v. Tomero, 462 F. Supp. 2d 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that
in using a cellular phone's microphone as a bug, "[t]he device functioned whether the phone
was powered on or off.").
114 Talk of the Nation: Surveillance via Cell Phone, supra note 12 (interview of Clifford
Fishman, law professor at The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law)
("[I]f the technology exists, the capacity is there, it's a question of what the law allows, who
the law allows to use the information or the technology and under what circumstances.").
15 See, e.g., Zick, supra note 37, at 3 (noting that scholarly concerns exist and will only
become more relevant and prevalent "as the technologies of communication and surveil-
lance become more widespread and more sophisticated.").
116 Id.
117 See, e.g., Texas Pen/Trap Case, supra note 10, at 748-49 (stating that the arguments
before the court have "serious implications for the balance between privacy and law en-
forcement"); U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing In re
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Third Report and Order, 14
F.C.C.R. 16,794, 46 (Aug. 26, 1999), for the proposition that "such a capability... poses
difficulties that could undermine individual privacy.").
118 See infra Part 1I.B, for a discussion of network-based and handset-based location
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and courts have haphazardly applied a number of statutes in deciding the types
of location information to which the government should have access. 2 ' In de-
termining the manner by which courts should protect this information, a review
of the various sections of federal legislation on which the government has re-
lied-and courts have struggled to interpret-is a crucial first step.
At the outset, it bears noting that wireless telecommunications carriers have
a general duty to keep customer information private.' Wireless carriers may
only divulge such "proprietary network information . . . [when] required by
law or with the approval of the customer."' 22 Despite this general ban on dis-
closure, the government has made a case for access to such information based
primarily on three sections of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
("ECPA").
A. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
In 1986, Congress passed the ECPA 23 with the belief that it struck "a fair
balance between the privacy expectations of American citizens and the legiti-
mate needs of law enforcement agencies."'24 The ECPA defines the criteria that
the government must meet before it can monitor electronic communications in
various ways. Specifically, the statute enumerates four methods for the gov-
ernment to gain information from electronic communications: wiretaps,'25
tracking devices,'26 pen registers and trap and trace devices,'27 and stored elec-
tronic communications.' 2
technologies.
119 Yung, supra note 39 at 196.
120 See infra Part V (discussing the various standards courts have required before grant-
ing access to cell phone tracking information and the assortment of arguments posed by the
government that courts have accepted and rejected).
121 Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, 47 U.S.C. § 222(a) (2000)
(discussing a duty "to protect the confidentiality of proprietary information of, and relating
to ... customers").
122 Id. § 222(c)(1). "Proprietary network information" includes "information that relates
to the ... location . . . of a telecommunications service subscribed to by any customer of a
telecommunications carrier." Id. § 222(h)(1)(A). Indeed, "without the express prior authori-
zation of the customer, a customer shall not be considered to have approved the use or dis-
closure of or access to--(1) call location information concerning the user of a commercial
mobile service." Id. § 222(0.
123 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848.
124 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559.
125 See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2000). Wiretaps, governed by 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22, are not
relevant to this discussion.
126 See id. 18 U.S.C. § 3117. At least one commentator suggests that no part of the ECPA
is applicable to GPS tracking. Yung, supra note 39, at 195. The government, however, has
relied on the ECPA in its three main arguments for getting location information based on
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1. Tracking Devices under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
A "tracking device" is defined as "an electronic or mechanical device which
permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.' 29 Under this defi-
nition, the ECPA does not require that the device be designed specifically as a
tracking device. Rather, any device that allows tracking, whether or not that
was the purpose of the device, is governed by the ECPA."' Thus, this language
left open the possibility that a cell phone could be a tracking device, even if
this possibility was not foreseeable when the law was passed. 3 ' Indeed, be-
cause the ECPA allowed for this possibility, cell phones are used as tracking
devices today.3 2 Accordingly, the issue the courts must determine is under
what circumstances and with what evidentiary standard the government should
be granted access to real-time cell site tracking information.'33
2. The Stored Communications Act
In addition to the access granted under the ECPA's tracking device section,
the government has argued in a number of cases'34 that it is entitled to real-time
tracking data based on another section of the ECPA, the Stored Communica-
tions Act ("SCA"). "' The SCA allows the government to obtain the contents of
a wire or electronic communication being stored in either electronic storage or
a remote computing service.'36 More specifically, section 2703(c) grants the
tower triangulation. See discussion infra Part V. It is well within the realm of possibilities
that the ECPA may be relied on to argue for tracking data from GPS-enabled cell phones as
well.
127 See id. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-26.
128 See id 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-10.
129 Id. § 3117(b).
130 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 9, at 150; see also Texas Pen/Trap Case, supra
note 10, at 753 ( "Aside from its welcome brevity, the definition is striking for its breadth.").
131 Texas Pen/Trap Case, supra note 10, at 754.
132 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 9, at 153 ("Given that current cellular technology
permits, and the Federal Communications Commission requires, that cellular phones be able
to be tracked in real time to within 100 meters of the phone's exact location, cellular phones
are for all intent and purposes, tracking devices.").
133 See discussion infra Part V.
134 See, e.g., Texas Pen/Trap Case, supra note 10, at 765; In re Application of the United
States for Orders Authorizing Installation and Use of Pen Registers and Caller Identification
Devices on Tel. Nos. [Sealed] and [Sealed], 416 F. Supp. 2d 390 (D. Md. 2006) [hereinafter
Maryland Pen/Trap Case].
135 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11 (2000).
136 Id. § 2703(a)-(b). The term "electronic storage" means "(A) any temporary, interme-
diate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission
thereof, and (B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service
for purposes of backup protection of such communication." Id. § 2510(17). The term "re-
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government access to "records concerning electronic communication ser-
vice."'37 Unlike other parts of the ECPA, the SCA allows disclosure of this
information with a comparatively low standard of "specific and articulable
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a
wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought,
are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation."'' The higher
probable cause standard is not required-and the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated-because the information the cell service provider gathered for its
"own legitimate business purposes," belongs to the carrier, and not the sub-
scriber. "'
3. The Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act and the "Pen/Trap
Statute"
Pen/Trap orders are among the most frequently employed criminal law en-
forcement mechanisms. 4 ° The use of pen registers,' or trap and trace de-
vices,"' is governed by the "Pen/Trap Statute."' 43 This statute grants the gov-
mote computing service" is defined as "the provision to the public of computer storage or
processing services by means of an electronic communications system." Id. § 2711(2).
137 Id. § 2703(c). This information includes the name, address, phone number, length,
and types of service. Id. § 2703(c)(1)(C).
138 Id. § 2703(d).
139 People v. Hall, 823 N.Y.S.2d 334, 343 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
140 Texas Pen/Trap Case, supra note 10, at 749.
141 Pen registers collect certain information about calls placed from a particular tele-
phone line and are defined as:
[A] device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signal-
ing information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic
communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such information shall not in-
clude the contents of any communication, but such term does not include any device or
process used by a provider or customer of a wire or electronic communication service
for billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for communications services provided
by such provider or any device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire
communication service for cost accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary
course of its business.
18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).
142 Trap and trace devices collect certain information about calls coming in to a particu-
lar telephone number and are defined as:
[A] device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which
identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling in-
formation reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communica-
tion, provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any
communication.
Id. § 3127(4).
143 The Pen/Trap Statute refers to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3122-27. FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra
note 9, at 146. Because they are governed by the same statute, pen registers and trap and
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emment access to information related to the processing and transmission of
wire or electronic communications, but not the contents of those communica-
tions. "'44 The government has argued in a number of cases that this includes
location information for calls made from cell phones.'45
The government's advantage from obtaining tracking location information
via the Pen/Trap Statute, as opposed to other portions of the ECPA, is the stat-
ute's relatively low standard of proof.'46 An order authorizing the use of a
pen/trap device requires only that the government show that "the information
likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing
criminal investigation."'47 Such little protection stems from the Supreme
Court's holding in Smith v. Maryland that no reasonable expectation of privacy
exists as to the phone numbers a person dials.'48 Compared to the SCA's spe-
cific and articulable facts standard or a probable cause requirement, this stan-
dard is relatively low and easier for the government to meet.'49 Thus, this lower
threshold, if accepted by the courts, would permit access to invaluable infor-
mation while severely encroaching on Fourth Amendment protections.
The Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA"), 5 °
however, makes clear why the ECPA's Pen/Trap Statute is not applicable to
GPS phones. CALEA was enacted in 1994 "to preserve the government's abil-
ity, pursuant to court order or other lawful authorization, to intercept commu-
nications involving advanced technologies such as digital or wireless transmis-
sion modes."'' It provides that a communications carrier may not provide, and
trace devices will hereinafter be referred to as "pen/trap devices."
I- 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (Supp. IV 2004).
145 See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of
Prospective Cell Site Data, 412 F. Supp. 2d 947 (E.D. Wis. 2006) [hereinafter Wisconsin
Pen/Trap Case]; In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomm.
Records and Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter New York Pen/Trap Case]; Texas Pen/Trap Case, supra note
10.
146 See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 9, at 147.
147 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2004).
148 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
149 Police need not demonstrate probable cause, nor even provide "specific and articu-
lable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or
electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and mate-
rial to an ongoing criminal investigation." 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2000).
150 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-414,
108 Stat. 4279.
151 H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 9 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3489;
see also, Stephanie Lockwood, Who Knows Where You've Been? Privacy Concerns Regard-
ing the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 307, 312
(2004) (stating that CALEA was enacted "to enumerate the obligations of telecommunica-
tions carriers to aid in intercepting digital communications.").
20071
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
the government may not obtain, "any information that may disclose the physi-
cal location of the subscriber" when the government's access is "acquired
solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices."'52
Nonetheless, the government has attempted to argue the Pen/Trap Statute as a
basis for obtaining such information.' 3
B. The Enhanced 911 System
Of course, if the location of a particular cell phone could not be determined,
any argument that the government was entitled to such information would be
moot. However, technological advances coupled with a federal statute have not
only made such cell location possible but have mandated it.'54 Cell location
information is already available and being utilized in myriad ways. This avail-
ability is due at least in part to the enhanced 911 ("E-91 1") program: a Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") initiative created to aid emergency
response services. 55
Since 1996, the FCC has promulgated a series of orders that have collec-
tively implemented the E-911 system.'56 These E-911 regulations'57 are "aimed
at improving the reliability of wireless 911 services and identifying the loca-
tion of wireless 911 callers to enable emergency response personnel to provide
assistance to them much more quickly."'58 Prior to the E-91 1 regulations, the
location of a 911 caller using a traditional landline was determined through a
reverse telephone directory.'9 A dispatcher then provided directions to emer-
gency personnel based on the address associated with that telephone number. 6 °
This system, however, did not comport with the rapid expansion of cellular
telephone use. Thus, the FCC established the E-911 system to ensure that 911
152 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) (2000).
153 See discussion infra Part V.B.
154 Reardon, supra note 2.
155 FCC Enhanced 911, http://www.fcc.gov/pshs/911/enhanced91l/Welcome.html (last
visited Nov. 7, 2007).
156 See In re Revision of the Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with En-
hanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 18,676 (June 12, 1996); In re Revision of the Commission's Rules
to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems, Third Report and
Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 17,388 (Sept. 15, 1999).
157 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2006).
158 FCC CONSUMER FACTS: WIRELESS 911 SERVICES 2 (2006),
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/wireless911 srvc.pdf.
159 FCC CONSUMER FACTS: COMMUNICATING DURING EMERGENCIES 1-2 (2005),
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/emergencies.pdf.
160 Id. at 2.
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callers using cell phones could be located with almost the same ease and accu-
racy as locating a land-based 911 caller. 6
The FCC implemented this system in two phases. Phase I required that cel-
lular service providers be able to provide to emergency dispatchers the cell
phone number and the location of the cell.'62 Under Phase II, cellular service
providers must provide more accurate location information geographically by
latitude and longitude.'63 The compliance and accuracy standards for Phase I
depend on the method chosen by the cellular service provider to comply with
those requirements.'64
Current technology presents providers with two primary methods by which
to obtain the location of a 911 caller in compliance with phase 11.65 The first
option involves network-based location technologies.'66 These techniques use
triangulation of cell phone signals picked up by three or more non-linear cell
towers.'67 The location of a cellular phone is calculated based on "the known
speed of radio signals."' 68 The E-911 regulations required service providers
choosing this route to comply with the Phase II requirements by October 2002,
i.e., that such services must be accurate to within three hundred meters for
ninety-five percent of calls, and to within one hundred meters for two-thirds of
911 calls.'69 Unfortunately, three hundred feet (approximately ninety-one me-
ters) is the limit of accuracy for such triangulation techniques,' thus limiting
the aid such techniques can provide to emergency responders in locating 911
callers. Indeed, the FCC has notified a number of wireless service providers
161 Id.; see also In re Revision of the Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with
Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems, Third Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 17,388,
1-8 (Sept. 15, 1999) (noting the importance of locating emergency callers in a timely
manner).
162 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(d)(1). "As of April 1, 1998 ... licensees subject to this section
must provide the telephone number of the originator of a 911 call and the location of the cell
site or base station receiving a 911 call from any mobile handset accessing their systems to
the designated Public Safety Answering Point." Id. "The term 'public safety answering
point' means a facility that has been designated to receive emergency calls and route them
to emergency service personnel." 47 U.S.C. § 222(h)(4) (2000).
163 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(e).
164 See id. § 20.18(h).
165 A third, hybrid option called "assisted GPS" also exists. See supra notes 29-31 and
accompanying text.
166 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(f). As of early 2007, only about seventy percent of emergency call
centers had become E-911 compliant, covering approximately eighty percent of the popula-
tion. Marguerite Reardon, Homing in on a Plan for Cellular 911, ZDNET NEWS, June 4,
2007, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1035 22-6188332.html.
167 Holloway et al., supra note 17, at 103.
168 Id.
169 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h)(1).
170 Norton, supra note 25.
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that such network-based technology "does not provide an adequate level of
public safety for callers."''
While some cellular providers still use these network-based technologies,
others have adopted handset-based location technologies to meet the Phase II
requirements of the E-91 1 regulations.'72 Handset-based location technologies
operate using GPS information to locate a phone.'73 Unlike network-based
technologies, GPS has an accuracy of approximately thirty feet."' This accu-
racy depends on the number of line-of-sight connections satellites can make
with a phone.'75 The FCC took into account the greater accuracy of GPS-reliant
handset-based systems when it set Phase II requirements for such technol-
ogy."'76 Cellular service providers choosing the handset-based option must be
able to provide an accurate location to within fifty meters for two-thirds of
calls, and to within one hundred fifty meters for ninety-five percent of calls.'7 7
Integration of GPS technology has accelerated as a result of FCC regula-
tions. The FCC's E-91 1 regulations have encouraged rapid growth in the de-
velopment of cellular phones incorporating GPS systems.' Sprint introduced
the first GPS-enabled phone: the Samsung SPH-300, which hit the market just
prior to the FCC's October 1, 2001 deadline for Phase II introduction of hand-
set-based technologies.'79 With the introduction of the SPH-300, Sprint became
the only cell service provider to meet the FCC's deadline, while other provid-
ers requested extensions. 8 ' Since then, dozens of other GPS-enabled cell
phones have entered the market, allowing other cell service providers to com-
171 Holloway et al., supra note 17, at 104.
172 Charles, supra note 28 ("Some companies, such as Cingular, adopted technology that
locates a cell phone by analyzing how its signal is picked up by different cell towers. Others,
including Verizon, Sprint and Nextel, decided to install a GPS receiver in every cell phone.
This generally determines location more accurately ... ").
173 Holloway et al., supra note 17, at 103. For an overview of the Global Positioning
System, see supra Part II.A.
174 Norton, supra note 25. If the accuracy is increased by a factor of ten, then the area in
which the phone may be located is decreased by a factor of one hundred, thereby providing
greater accuracy to firemen, police officers, EMTs, and indeed to the 911 caller. Id.
175 Holloway et al., supra note 17, at 103.
176 Compare 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h)(1) (2006) (setting forth network-based accuracy re-
quirements), with id. § 20.18(h)(2) (setting forth handset-based accuracy requirements).
177 Id. § 20.18(h)(2).
178 See Charles, supra note 28.
179 Press Release, Sprint, Sprint and Samsung Telecommunications America Launch





ply with Phase I1 of the E-911 regulations.'' In turn, this has led to more accu-
rate information for first responders, and increased public safety." 2
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF CELL PHONE
TRACKING
As cellular phones proliferate and evolve, the privacy considerations impli-
cated by their use follow a similar trend. The technology of cellular phones is
most implicated in the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures. Likewise, the solution to these privacy concerns lies
within the Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable cause to demonstrate
the reasonableness of a search or seizure. Specifically, the Fourth Amendment
provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... .""' The
exact application of this text to electronic communications, in general, and to
cellular tracking, in particular, has proven a struggle for the courts.
A. Katz and Smith: Foundations of Fourth Amendment Protections
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court held that electronic recording by
the government of a conversation made from a public telephone booth violated
the caller's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.'84
The decision hinged on the fact that although the call was placed in public, the
caller took steps to isolate himself and maintain the privacy of his conversa-
tion."'85 While important for the premise that the Fourth Amendment protects
what one seeks to keep private, and society agrees is private, Katz gives little
guidance regarding the application of the Fourth Amendment to cell site or
GPS tracking data obtained from a cell phone. In fact, the case's main contri-
bution to Fourth Amendment construction comes from Justice Harlan's con-
18j Id.
182 See FCC CONSUMER FACTS: WIRELESS 911 SERVICES, supra note 158, at 2.
183 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
184 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
185 Id. at 351-52. The Majority noted:
No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend's apartment, or in a taxicab, a
person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to
place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece
will not be broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore




currence, which provided a two-part test to determine whether the information
is protected: "first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expecta-
tion of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable."" 86
More than a decade later, the Supreme Court adopted Justice Harlan's two-
fold requirement in Smith v. Maryland.'87 In Smith, law enforcement, acting
without a warrant, installed a pen register device to record numbers dialed
from the defendant's phone.'88 Applying the twofold analysis, the Court held
that the Fourth Amendment did not apply. In doing so, the Court first found it
doubtful that telephone users have any expectation of privacy regarding the
numbers they dial.'89 Nor did the defendant manifest any such expectation
through his actions.19 The defendant "voluntarily conveyed numerical infor-
mation to the telephone company and 'exposed' that information to its equip-
ment in the ordinary course of business."'' The Court further explained that
while the defendant's actions of placing the calls from his home phone may
have been calculated to keep the contents of the conversation private, a pen
register is unable to record the contents of electronic communications, merely
the numbers dialed by a phone.'92 Therefore, applying Justice Harlan's test, the
Court stated that even if the defendant had manifested such an expectation of
privacy, society was not prepared to regard that expectation as reasonable.'93
Applying the two-part analysis, the Court held that the use of a pen register
to record outgoing calls from the defendant's phone did not constitute a
search.'94 Thus, no Fourth Amendment protection existed, and the device could
be installed and used without a warrant."' Congress responded by enacting the
ECPA, particularly the Pen/Trap Statute, which codifies the holding in Smith,
at least insofar as it establishes that something less than probable cause is re-
quired for the installation and use of a pen/trap device.'96
186 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
187 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
188 Id. at 737. For a description of pen register devices, see supra Part III.A.3.
189 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
190 Id. at 743 (observing that the use of a home phone may have been calculated to keep
the contents of the conversation private, similar to the use of an enclosed public telephone in
Katz, but that nothing he did preserved the privacy of the numbers dialed by the defendant).
191 Id. at 744.
192 Id. at 741,743.
193 Id. at 745.
194 Id. at 745-46.
195 Id.
196 See discussion supra Part II1.A.3.
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B. Knotts and Karo: The Tracking Device Cases
In addition to codifying the standard for pen/trap devices, the ECPA defines
tracking devices and establishes that probable cause must be demonstrated
before law enforcement may use a tracking device.'9 7 Prior to the passage of
the ECPA, any Fourth Amendment protection from tracking devices came
solely from case law. 9 '
In 1983, the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Knotts that a tracking
device placed in the defendant's vehicle and used to follow the car when it was
out of visual surveillance constituted neither a search nor seizure, and therefore
was not subject to the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment.'99
The Knotts decision turned on the fact that the canister that the defendant was
transporting was being tracked on public roads.9 ' In applying the Smith analy-
sis, the Court found that "[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thor-
oughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements."2" Any-
one who happened to be on the same roads, and cared to look, could have ob-
tained the information acquired by the tracking device.2"2 In arriving at its deci-
sion, the Court noted that such tracking devices serve only to effectuate obser-
vation of already public occurrences, relying heavily on the fact that the device
was not used to track the defendant inside private spheres such as a residence,
which is clearly protected by the Fourth Amendment.0 3 The importance of this
distinction was realized the following year, when the Supreme Court con-
fronted the issue of a tracking device's use in a private residence in United
States v. Karo.2 °4
In Karo, law enforcement officials used a tracking device to track certain
drug-related chemicals through a series of private residences and storage lock-
ers. 20 5 The defendant challenged such use of a tracking device, claiming that
surveillance inside private residences violated the Fourth Amendment.0 6 The
Court stated, "private residences are places in which the individual normally
expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant,
and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justi-
197 See id.
198 See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559.
199 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
200 Id.
201 Id. at 281.
202 Id. at 285.
203 Id. at 284-85.
204 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
205 Id at 708-09.
206 Id. at 713-14.
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fiable."2 7 Ultimately, the Court held that a search of a private residence, even
when conducted with a tracking device, must be conducted pursuant to a war-
rant obtained after demonstrating probable cause."' Following the Karo deci-
sion, the ECPA amended the section governing tracking devices to require a
warrant based on probable cause.2"9
C. The Probable Cause Requirement and Rule 41 Warrants
Following the Knotts decision and the enactment of the ECPA, a demonstra-
tion of probable cause is required before a warrant may issue allowing the
search or seizure of a person, place, or effect protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment. Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the issuance
of such probable cause warrants.20 This rule provides that a magistrate or other
judge "must issue the warrant if there is probable cause to search for and seize
a person or property or to install and use a tracking device." '' The rule also
lays out what the warrant must contain"' and what types of people and prop-
erty may be searched and seized pursuant to such a warrant. 3 Likewise, it lays
out the requirements for a warrant authorizing the installation and use of a
tracking device." 4 Specifically, a warrant for a tracking device must "identify
the person or property to be tracked, designate the magistrate judge to whom it
must be returned, and specify a reasonable length of time that the device may
be used."2 '5 Rule 41 relies on the ECPA's definition of tracking device." 6
Thus, if the courts or Congress determine that a GPS-enabled cell phone can
be used as a tracking device under this definition, a warrant based on probable
cause must be required to authorize law enforcement to use it. Only such a
warrant sufficiently protects the Fourth Amendment considerations implicated
by law enforcement use of cell phones to determine location. This is especially
true in light of the Karo decision because cell phones are frequently carried
into private residences and other locations where a reasonable expectation of
privacy may exist.
207 Id. at 714.
208 Id. at 718.
209 See 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2000).
210 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
211 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1).
212 Fed. R. Crim. P.41(e)(2).
213 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c).
214 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(B).
215 Id.
216 FED. R. CRiM. P. 41(a)(2)(E) (stating that "'[tlracking device' has the meaning set out
in 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b)"); see also discussion supra Part III.A.1.
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V. JUDICIAL INDECISION REGARDING THE CLASSIFICATION OF
CELLULAR TRACKING DATA
Justice Brandeis prophetically stated that "[s]ubtler and more far-reaching
means of invading privacy have become available to the government .... The
progress of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is
not likely to stop with wire tapping."2 '7 When Justice Brandeis so opined in
1928, nobody could have imagined the technological leaps that have allowed
for cellular telephones and GPS satellites. The technology that has brought
together families and friends, sellers and consumers, simultaneously provides
almost boundless potential for domestic spying through real-time tracking data
collected via cellular GPS signals. In an age when terrorism prevention is used
to justify preemptive government intrusion into the private sphere while watch
lists and biometrics aid the cause," 8 cellular tracking is just one of dozens of
threats to personal privacy interests and the Fourth Amendment. Courts face
the prospect of balancing legitimate law enforcement goals against deeply en-
sconced privacy interests of American citizens, and these concerns must be
balanced with regard to traditional implements, new innovations, and tech-
nologies not yet even on the drawing board. 29
Several courts have been asked to give the government access to real-time
cell phone tracking information. Thus far, while a few federal district courts
have tried to tackle the issue, no circuit court has taken up the question.22 °
Among the courts that have examined the issue, no clear consensus has devel-
oped as to whether the government should be allowed access to this data, and if
so, what burden of proof is required to get it.22' Notably, so far, these courts
have only been asked to deal with network-based technologies, those less-
accurate methods of cellular location based on tower triangulation.222 It seems
that no court has specifically been asked to grant government access to real-
time cellular GPS tracking information. However, the two systems are quite
similar,223 and by analogizing GPS methods to these network-based cases, it
217 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473-74 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
218 See Lauren D. Adkins, Biometrics: Weighing Convenience and National Security
Against Your Privacy, 13 MICH. TELECOM. & TECH. L. REv. 541, 546 (2007); Karen DeY-
oung, U.S. Watch Lists Are Drawn From Massive Clearinghouse, WASH. POST, Mar. 25,
2007, at AO1.
219 Talk of the Nation: Surveillance via Cell Phone, supra note 12 (interview of Matt
Richtel, technology correspondent for The New York Times) ("[T]his debate happens each
time there are technological advances, and the law has to catch up to them.").
220 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 9, at 149.
221 Id. at 147.
222 See id.
223 See discussion supra Part III.B.
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should be obvious that courts will face the same and perhaps even greater
problems when asked to grant the government access to more accurate real-
time tracking information possible through the GPS.
The primary issue for the courts to resolve in these cases has been to deter-
mine what standard the government must meet under the ECPA to obtain real-
time cell site tracking data. Specifically, the issue focuses on whether such data
is properly classified as: (1) "[r]ecords concerning electronic communication
service ' under the SCA, and therefore obtainable upon the intermediate stan-
dard of "specific and articulable facts;" '225 or (2) information collected by
Pen/Trap devices, which requires only proof of relevance to an ongoing crimi-
nal investigation;226 or finally, (3) information collected by cell phones which
should be considered "tracking devices" and their real-time location available
only with a probable cause warrant, the strictest standard.2 7 The government
has made several innovative, if not always persuasive, arguments in trying to
obtain cell site information based on a standard lower than probable cause.228
By advocating these lower standards, "the government seeks to avail itself of
the easiest, least stringent means possible to obtain that information under the
current statutory scheme. 229
A. Tracking Information Does Not Fit Within the Stored Communication Act
A logical first step in categorizing cell site information, and, thus, determin-
ing what standard must be met before law enforcement may obtain such data,
is to look at the government's claim that cell site data falls within the SCA and
is obtainable with proof of "specific and articulable facts showing that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic
communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and
material to an ongoing criminal investigation. ' 23" That there is no mention of
cell site data in the plain language of the statute is the first strike against this
argument. While the laundry list of subscriber information obtainable under
224 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (Supp. IV 2004). This information includes the name, address,
phone number, length and types of service, and means of payment for such services. Id. §
2703(c)(2).
225 Id. § 2703(d).
226 Id. § 3123(a)(1)-(2).
227 See Texas Pen/Trap Case, supra note 10, at 753 (setting out the hierarchy of burdens
the government must meet to obtain authority to interfere with private electronic communi-
cations).
228 FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 9, at 153.
229 Id. at 151.
230 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
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this section does include "address,"23 ' "this plainly refers to the subscriber's
nominal residence for billing or contact purposes, rather than the physical loca-
tion(s) where the mobile phone is used. 232
A second strike against the SCA argument is the fact that the SCA does not
contemplate providing law enforcement with the ability to conduct real-time
prospective surveillance. The statute's language shows that it was not enacted
with the purpose of allowing such real-time tracking. 233 The SCA grants access
to "stored" communications; it does not regulate access to real-time data.23'
Finally, the government resorts to an argument based on the SCA's language
that law enforcement "may require a provider of electronic communication
service ... to disclose a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber
to or customer of such service. '235 The legislative history of the SCA indicates
that the information contemplated in the statute is "information about the cus-
tomer's use of the service not the content of the customer's communica-
tions." '236 The government has argued that cell site data falls within the ambit of
this allowance and is thus obtainable under the SCA.237 At least one court has
rejected this argument by looking at the statutory definition of "electronic
communication. ' 23 ' This definition excepts all communications from a tracking
device. 239 Thus, after deciding that a cell phone constituted a tracking device,
one court reached the conclusion that "[t]racking device information such as
cell site data is plainly not a form of electronic communication at all. 24° It then
follows that such information is not obtainable under the SCA and its concomi-
tant lower standard.
Writing for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Judge
Smith made a troubling observation related to the SCA. In discounting any
argument for cell-site information, he noted that because a cell user "does not
use the phone to track his own movements in real time, prospective cell site
data appears to be unrelated to any customer (as opposed to law enforcement)
use of the provider's services. '"241 Were real-time cell site data used by the cus-
tomer, however, the implication is that such data might be obtainable under the
SCA. With GPS-enabled cell phones, customers may very well use the phone
231 Id. § 2703(c)(2).
232 Texas Pen/Trap Case, supra note 10, at 758.
233 Maryland Pen/Trap Case, supra note 134, at 395.
234 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 9, at 152.
235 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1).
236 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 38 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3592.
237 See discussion supra Part 11I.A.2.
238 Texas Pen/Trap Case, supra note 10, at 758-59.
239 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(C) (2000).
240 Texas Pen/Trap Case, supra note 10, at 759.
241 Id. (emphasis in original).
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to track their own movements (or more accurately, to map exactly where they
want to go just before or as they go there). By Judge Smith's reasoning, then,
GPS location data could be considered customer information, thereby falling
under Congress' understanding of the information available through resort to
the SCA. On the other hand, this argument may still be rejected by recalling
that information from a tracking device has traditionally been held unobtain-
able under the SCA. Still, this counter-argument demonstrates the need for
Congressional clarification of what standard must be met before cell site data
(and its analogue, GPS tracking data) may be obtained by the government.
Because the SCA does not allow the government to obtain real-time cell site
data, the next logical place to look for such an allowance is within the ECPA's
Pen/Trap Statute.
B. The Pen/Trap Statute Does Not Grant Access to Tracking Data
Even though such arguments still require a mere demonstration of relevance,
courts have put more stock in, or at least had a more difficult time refuting,
government arguments based on the Pen/Trap Statute. Two cases in particular
have provided analyses of the Pen/Trap Statute as a mechanism for granting
government access to cell site location data.242 The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas was willing to throw out the Pen/Trap Statute with
minimal analysis stating that "[t]he minimal pen/trap standard does not author-
ize access to cell site data; Congress made that much clear in the Communica-
tions Assistance to Law Enforcement Act of 1994 ("CALEA"). 243 Indeed, the
legislative history of CALEA appears to support this conclusion. In enacting
CALEA, Congress intended to remedy the privacy concerns caused by the fact
that "in some cellular systems, transactional data that could be obtained by a
pen register may include location information." 2" Through its plain language
and legislative history, CALEA clearly shows the Pen/Trap Statute to be an
insufficient basis for obtaining cell site data.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the
Pen/Trap Statute is at least in part an acceptable instrument through which the
government may obtain cell site data.245 In its analysis, the court first noted that
the USA PATRIOT Act amended the Pen/Trap Statute, adding "signaling in-
formation" to the laundry list of information obtainable through a pen regis-
242 See New York Pen/Trap Case, supra note 145; Texas PenTrap Case, supra note 10.
243 Texas Pen/Trap Case, supra note 10, at 757.
244 H. REP. No. 103-827, at 17 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3497.
245 New York PenTrap Case, supra note 145, at 449.
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ter.246 The court then accepted the proposition that the term "signaling informa-
tion" includes location information related to the towers used by a particular
cell phone. 47 In interpreting this term to include cell site data, the court held
that the Pen/Trap Statute would have allowed the government to access such
data. 4 However, by excepting location data from call-identifying information
available to law enforcement, CALEA "plainly reflects an underlying assump-
tion that physical location data would have been obtainable under the Pen Reg-
ister Statute in the absence of the exception clause [of CALEA].."249 Thus, be-
cause of CALEA's exception clause, cell site information is not obtainable
under the Pen/Trap Statute of the ECPA.
Regardless of this apparent clarity, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York went on to scrutinize the language of CALEA, finding
what it interpreted as a loophole that allowed government access to cell site
information. Rather than forbidding cell site information "pursuant" to the
Pen/Trap Statute, the text of CALEA includes the phrase "solely pursuant. 25 °
This language left the court "with the conclusion that Congress has given a
direction that cell site information may be obtained through some unexplained
combination of the Pen Register Statute with some other unspecified mecha-
nism.""'
This idea of combining the Pen/Trap Statute with other statutory authority is
known as the hybrid theory.252 The government's most common hybrid argu-
ment is that the combination of the Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA permit it to
246 New York Pen/Trap Case, supra note 145, at 438-39 (citing USA PATRIOT Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216(c)(2), 115 Stat. 272, 290). The Pen/Trap Statute defines
"pen register" as a "device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing,
or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or elec-
tronic communication is transmitted." 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (Supp. IV 2004) (emphasis
added).
247 New York Pen/Trap Case, supra note 145, at 439 (citing U.S. Telecom Ass'n. v.
FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 463-64 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
248 Id. at 440. The court did not, however, reach the issue of whether "signaling informa-
tion" would allow the government, to continuously track a cell phone regardless of call
activity. Id. at 439 n.2.
249 New York Pen/Trap Case, supra note 145, at 440 (emphasis in original).
250 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(2000).
251 New York Pen/Trap Case, supra note 145, at 442; see also In re Application of the
United States for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and
Trap and Trace Device; (2) Authorizing the Release of Subscriber and Other Information;
and (3) Authorizing the Disclosure of Location-Based Services, No. 1:06-MC-6, 2006 WL
1876847, at *3 (N.D. Ind. July 5, 2006) [hereinafter Indiana Pen/Trap Case] ("The use of
the word solely in the exception provision of the CALEA has created considerable dubiety
in the courts concerning the appropriate application of the exception to cell site location
information.").
252 See FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 9, at 152.
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obtain real-time cell site tracking data without resort to a probable cause war-
rant.253 A dozen courts have analyzed hybrid arguments, and more than half
have rejected them.254 Those courts that have rejected the hybrid argument and
denied access to cell site data under a Pen/Trap-SCA combination have done
so based on the plain language of CALEA's exception clause, and on legisla-
tive history. For example, one court reasoned that if the legislature "intended to
allow prospective cell site information to be obtained by means of the com-
bined authority of the SCA and the Pen/Trap Statute, such intent is not at all
apparent from the statutes themselves. Indeed . . . the legislative history of
CALEA would suggest Congress's intent to be otherwise." '255 While some
courts have accepted hybrid arguments, the prior examination of the flaws
inherent in both the Pen/Trap Statute argument256 and the SCA argument257
should make clear that such a hybrid argument suffers the same deficiencies.
C. Cell Site Data Must Be Classified as Data Obtained From a Tracking
Device
After examining the accuracy of cellular locating techniques and their vari-
ous uses, whether or not GPS-enabled cell phones are invasive of privacy, it is
hard to escape the conclusion that real-time cell site data falls squarely within
the ambit of tracking device information under the ECPA.258 Of the three sec-
tions of the ECPA arguably applicable to cell phone tracking methods, the
tracking device category provides the best fit.259 Defined as "an electronic or
253 Id.
254 See, e.g., Indiana Pen/Trap Case, supra note 251, at *4; In re Application of the
United States for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular
Tel., No. 06 Crim. Misc. 01., 2006 WL 468300, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006); Maryland
Pen/Trap Case, supra note 134; In re the Application of the United States for an Order
Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and/or Trap and Trace for Mobile
Identification No. (585) 111-1111 and the Disclosure of Subscriber and Activity Info. under
18 U.S.C. § 2703, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211 (W.D.N.Y. 2006); Wisconsin Pen/Trap Case, supra
note 145; In re the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of
Prospective Cell Site Info., 407 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D. D.C. 2005); In re an Application of the
United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Installation of a Pen Register and a Trap and
Trace Device and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 396 F.
Supp. 2d 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Texas Pen/Trap Case, supra note 10.
255 Wisconsin Pen/Trap Case, supra note 145, at 958 (setting out the reasoning relied
upon by many of the courts that have rejected the hybrid argument).
256 See supra Part V.1.
257 See supra Part V.A.
258 Texas Pen/Trap Case, supra note 10, at 757.
259 Texas Pen/Trap Case, supra note 10, at 753. The phrase "arguably applicable" is
used here to denote the fact that the government has based arguments on these other sections
of the ECPA. As previous sections have shown, however, logical and statutory flaws exist in
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mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or
object," 260 the term "tracking devices" is broad enough to encompass cell
phones. Despite the breadth of the ECPA's definition, some courts have held
that a cell phone does not fit within its meaning, or was not contemplated un-
der Congress's statutory definition. For example, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California determined that because cell phones could not be
used as tracking devices when the ECPA was passed in 1986, Congress did not
contemplate their inclusion within that term.26'
This argument is improper. It limits law enforcement to using tracking de-
vices that existed when the ECPA was passed in 1986, despite technical and
technological advancements. Although the exact form of future tracking ad-
vancements was not contemplated, the potential for advancements forced Con-
gress to leave the statute broad. 262 Far from excluding new technologies, the
sheer breadth of the definition indicates that Congress recognized that there
could be unforeseeable advances.263 Moreover, it is doubtful that, when used to
track the location of a cellular subscriber, cell phones are so drastically differ-
ent from the tracking devices that existed in 1986 or that exist now. Indeed, the
information that can be gleaned from a traditional tracking device is not much
different from that obtained from a cell phone through cell site data.264 In some
cases, the devices are so similar that they rely on the same cell towers for op-
eration.265 Still, the government has attempted to argue that cell phones are not
tracking devices and therefore not subject to the higher probable cause burden
concomitant with that classification.
Another government argument against classifying cell phones as tracking
devices is that the location information derived from real-time cell site infor-
mation is not sufficiently detailed to qualify the device as a tracking device.266
Courts and commentators alike have rejected this argument. 267 First, the ECPA
these arguments. See discussion supra Parts V.A and V.B.
260 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) (2000).
261 In re Application for an Order Authorizing the Extension and Use of a Pen Register
Device, No. 07-SW-034 GGH, 2007 WL 397129, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2007) ("[O]ne
must look at the meaning of electronic or mechanical device in 1986, the date of passage of
§ 3117(b), and the legislative history which indicates that the device contemplated was only
of the 'beeper' variety.").
262 See Texas Pen/Trap Case, supra note 10, at 753-54 ("By adopting the broader lan-
guage, Congress may simply have been anticipating future advances in tracking technology.
Such advances have indeed come to pass.").
263 Id.
264 See id. at 754 ("[Tlhe distinction between cell site data and information gathered by a
tracking device has practically vanished.").
265 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 9, at 149.
266 Texas Pen/Trap Case, supra note 10, at 755.
267 See, e.g., id. at 751-52, 757; see also FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 9, at 152
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definition of tracking device does not include any accuracy requirements.268
Additionally, the inclusion of GPS chips in cell phones has greatly increased
the accuracy of location compared to network-based location technologies.269
Despite government arguments to the contrary, "the ability to pinpoint in real
time the location of a cell phone to within meters challenges the notion that the
information is not 'detailed.""'27 Cell phone tracking creates the potential for a
map detailing the movements of a cell user.' Such detailed accuracy is both
required by the E-91 1 mandate272 and available to private consumers using
parental or employee tracking systems.273 Faced with these counter-arguments,
it seems an exercise in futility to argue that a cell phone does not fit the defini-
tion of a tracking device.274 At least some courts have reached the same conclu-
sion, and in so doing have required a probable cause warrant to authorize the
use of a tracking device.275
In perhaps a final effort to obtain tracking information under some burden
lower than probable cause, the government has argued that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply because there is no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in cell site information.276 This claim stems from the argument that, like
the numbers dialed by a caller, there is no expectation of privacy in the loca-
tion information transferred to the cell service provider.277 The flaw in this
contention is that, unlike the numbers dialed, cell site information is not volun-
tarily conveyed by the cellular user to the service provider.7 Similarly, loca-
tion information is unlike numbers dialed; while customers may reasonably
("[T]he ability to pinpoint in real time the location of a cell phone to within meters chal-
lenges the notion that the information is not 'detailed."').
268 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) (2000); see also Texas Pen/Trap Case, supra note 10, at 753.
269 See discussion supra Part III.B. Indeed, as of May 2000, the government ended Selec-
tive Availability, the intentional degradation of GPS signals available to commercial GPS
devices. President Clinton stated that "[t]his will mean that civilian users of GPS will be
able to pinpoint locations up to ten times more accurately" than when Selective Availability
was active. Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President Regarding the
United States' Decision to Stop Degrading Global Positioning System Accuracy (May 1,
2000), available at http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/gps/selective-availability.htm.
270 FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 9, at 152.
271 Lockwood, supra note 151, at 312.
272 See 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h) (2006); see also supra Part III.B.
273 See supra discussion Part II.C.
274 See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 9, at 152 ("[T]he ECPA so broadly defines
what a 'tracking device' is that it must be hard for the Assistant United States Attorney to
argue with a straight face that a cell phone does not meet that broad definition.")
275 See, e.g., Texas Pen/Trap Case, supra note 10, at 751-52, 757.
276 Id. at 756.
277 The Supreme Court in Smith rejected the contention that an expectation of privacy
exists in the numbers dialed on a phone. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-43 (1979);
see also discussion supra Part IV.A.
278 Texas Pen/Trap Case, supra note 10, at 756-57.
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expect service providers to collect the numbers they dial for billing and fraud
prevention,279 customers would have no reason to think that a phone company
might collect information on their locations. On the contrary, customers have a
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their location information. How-
ever, cell service providers not only possess the technological capabilities to
collect this information, but they are required by law to do so, and to a high
degree of accuracy, under the E-91 1 program.28 To call such a transmittal of
information voluntary is to leave the would-be cell subscriber with a Hobson's
choice: use a cell phone that is easily tracked by the government, or use none
at all.28' Inherent in the E-91 1 program is the recognition by the government of
the importance of having a cell phone in case of emergency.282 Given this rec-
ognized importance, it is crucial that the government protect location informa-
tion rather than force cell subscribers to reject cell phones altogether in favor
of privacy interests.
D. Trends Toward Protectionism by Requiring Probable Cause
With a handful of outliers, the courts that have been asked to grant cell site
information have thus far demonstrated an inclination to protect privacy. That
is, most courts have required the government to demonstrate probable cause
before issuing a warrant for such cell site data. These courts have preferred to
279 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
280 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2006). While it is true that cellular service providers may collect
information on the locations of calls placed by customers for purposes of charging roaming
fees, such customers reasonably expect that information to be used only for billing purposes.
Justice Marshall, in Smith v. Maryland, stated in his dissent that:
[E]ven assuming, as I do not, that individuals 'typically know' that a phone company
monitors calls for internal reasons, it does not follow that they expect this information
to be made available to the public in general or the government in particular.... Those
who disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business purpose
need not assume that this information will be released to other persons for other pur-
poses.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
281 A Hobson's Choice is an apparently free choice that in reality leaves no choice what-
soever. The phrase derives from a 17th-century liveryman who required his customers to
take either the horse nearest the stable door, or no horse at all. Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/hobson's+choice (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
Justice Marshall recognized this paradox writing that "unless a person is prepared to forgo
use of what for many has become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but
accept the risk of surveillance. It is idle to speak of 'assuming' risks in contexts where, as a
practical matter, individuals have no realistic alternative." Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted).




err on the side of caution. They reasoned that the high standard of probable
cause also grants access to the information if in truth it could have been ob-
tained under a lower standard.283 Although each section of the ECPA calls for a
different standard, from the Pen/Trap Statute's relevance requirement up to the
probable cause requirement of tracking devices,284 "[o]ne feature of ECPA is
that through use of greater legal process officials can gain access to any infor-
mation that they could obtain with lesser process." '285
VI. CONCLUSION: THE CASE FOR LEGISLATIVE CLARIFICATION
While most courts have denied the government access to cell site data absent
a probable cause warrant, a few have granted it with mere proof of relevance
under the Pen/Trap Statute, the SCA, or a combination thereof. Such conflict-
ing decisions leave both cellular users and law enforcement officers in the
lurch, unsure of how any particular decision will come down the next time
around. Such fact-specific decisions "seem to struggle to make statutes apply
where they should not and only create a judicial headache with unwieldy re-
sults lacking in uniform consensus." '286
As compared to cell site data obtained through tower triangulation, the inte-
gration of GPS technology to cell phones greatly improves the accuracy with
which a phone and its user can be tracked. Notoriously slow to evolve, the
common law lags far behind such technological evolution. Before courts have
figured out how to treat one piece of technology, it becomes obsolete and is
replaced by the next generation of stronger, faster, better machinery. In this
case, courts have yet to find a consensus approach to cell site data, and already
its more accurate GPS analogue has flooded the market. As this technology
becomes ubiquitous and inevitably evolves and improves, it is crucial that
Congress step in to clarify how it should be treated by the judicial system.2"7
Congress must pass legislation carefully crafted to serve the dual purpose of
283 See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of
Prospective Cell Site Information, No. 06-MISC-004, 2006 WL 2871743, at *4 (E.D. Wis.
2006).
284 And beyond that high burden to the so-called "super-warrant" showing required for
wiretapping. Id. at * 1-2.
285 JAMES G. CARR & PATRICIA L. BELLIA, LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 4:77, at
4-193 (2006).
286 FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 9, at 154.
287 See Talk of the Nation: Surveillance via Cell Phone, supra note 12 (interview of
Professor Clifford Fishman) ("[T]he fact that judges are beginning to look at this issue criti-
cally is useful, it's good. I think the legislature, ultimately, is the body that should make
these very nuanced policy judgments and decisions, but in the absence of legislative action
the courts understandably feel compelled to step in.").
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clarifying the judicial treatment that should be applied to presently existing
technology, while also providing a clear guideline for the treatment of future
technological advances.
However, cellular tracking technology is evolving at a pace far outmatching
the speed at which congressional legislation can be enacted. Laws governing
such technology are, if not out-of-date by the time they are drafted, very nearly
so by the time they are enacted. Vagueness is a necessary and inevitable evil in
such legislation, built in to compensate the lag time between technological
innovation and congressional legislation. The vagueness that is necessary and
beneficial in legislating about technology has left unanswered questions which
the judiciary has proven unable to answer. Indeed, as one scholar has stated:
[T]he time is well past that Congress should have taken another good, hard look at the
entire issue of surveillance technology, both in terms of when the government can use
it and also in terms of when private industry should be allowed to use surveillance
technology information. Congress has a wide range of priorities, obviously, but this
one ought to be fairly high.288
The use of the Global Positioning System to locate cell phones is the latest,
but certainly not the last, improvement in tracking technologies. Enacted in
1986, the ECPA is quite simply out of touch with the realities of today's tech-
nology. Some commentators have argued that the statutory scheme already in
place for cellular location technology and cell phone tracking is clear.289 Thus,
one might expect the judiciary to reach the same conclusion time and again,
yet they have not. The arguments presented herein and those made by scholars
and judges necessitate the conclusion that proof of probable cause is required
to obtain access to tracking data derived from cell phones. It is imperative that
Congress legislatively mandate such requirements. The interests of uniformity,
judicial efficiency and, greatest of all, privacy protection, demand such Con-
gressional action.
288 Id. Another commentator expressed his cynicism about the potential for misuse of
GPS-enabled cellular tracking technology and the likelihood of the Congressional clarifica-
tion called for herein:
My solution is a simple one. It's called the Off switch-the antidote to any new tech-
nology that threatens our life, liberty, or pursuit of happiness .... Of course, we could
also use a formal law that expressly forbids GPS tracking without a warrant, but these
days, I have more faith in engineers than in Congress.
Costa, supra note 68.
289 See, e.g., FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 9, at 153-54.
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